Abstract

Non-point source pollution from agriculture is the leading cause of surface water quality impariments as defined by the clean water act. Impossible or prohibitively costly to monitor each source. So, consistent with the notion of toatl maximum daily loads at a watershed level, economists have developed incentive mechanisms based on ambient water quality. This project uses experimental economic techiniques to see if these mechanisms can be applied in real world situations.

Issue

Everyone in the United States cares about surface water quality. Many individuals experience lost utility if the quality of these resources are impacted.

Our reserach is obviously important to EPAs mission as it was funded in a grant process that funded only 5% of submissions. This is funded through the Science To Achieve Results (STAR) program.

Response

Our progress was reported in a special session of the American Agircutlural Economics Association meeting organized jointly with the EPA.

Importantly our results show that using subsidies to reduce amibient pollution levels can lead to over abatement. Instead, reducing existing subsidies or imposing taxes for levels exceeding tragets is more effective.

Impact

None to date

Funding Sources

• Federal Formula Funds - Research (e.g., Hatch, McIntire-Stennis, Animal Health)
• USEPA STAR GRANTS PROGRAM

Key Personnel

• William D. Schulze, Cornell University
• Richard Bosivert, Cornell University
• Christian Vossler, University of Tennesse at Knoxville
• Kathleen Segerson, University of Connecticut at Storrs